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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical: professional basketball 
player Yao Ming (“Yao”) of the Houston Rockets gets the 
“Twizzlers” candy logo temporarily tattooed on his right bicep.  
Hershey Foods Corporation (“Hershey”), owner of the Twizzlers 
candy and logo, is paying Yao $250,000 to wear the temporary 
tattoo, which will naturally wear off in two weeks—after Yao has 
played in several televised games, appeared on countless sports 
highlight shows all over the country, and likely graced the back 
cover of various newspapers. 
Hershey is a direct competitor of Nestlé, an official corporate 
sponsor of the National Basketball Association (“NBA”).1  
Nevertheless, through its creative arrangement with Yao, Hershey 
has effectively circumvented Nestlé’s exclusive contract with the 
NBA, and has advertised its product in a variety of media for a 
fraction of what it would likely cost to purchase one minute of 
advertising during a national broadcast of an NBA game. 
This type of marketing ploy, called tattoo advertising, has 
already made a controversial appearance in the sporting world.  
Beach volleyball players and skateboarders have worn tattoo 
advertisements and skin patches.2  Boxers have been using tattoo 
 
 1 See generally Michael Futterman, Sports Tattoos Could Lead to Dollar Signs, 
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2001, at C1 (stating that Nestlé has paid several 
million dollars to be the exclusive candy sponsor of the NBA). 
 2 Marathon runners, bodybuilders, and tennis players have expressed interest in 
offering skin-space for sponsorship as well. Sam Walker, On Sports: This Skin for Rent, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at W10.  In addition, an Australian soccer club recently 
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advertising to make extra money for several years.3  A certain 
online gambling site has temporarily tattooed its internet address 
across boxers’ backs for televised fights, despite resistance from 
boxing regulators and television broadcasters.4  While no NBA 
player has yet worn a tattoo advertisement, several players 
considered it, and the NBA asserted that it will prohibit the 
practice.5  In response, the NBA Players Association has stated it 
believes tattoo advertising is permissible, and would likely file a 
grievance with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) if 
the NBA thwarts a tattoo advertising campaign.6 
Before the NBA formally issues a blanket prohibition of tattoo 
advertising to protect league and corporate sponsorships and 
marketing agreements, does the league have an obligation to 
consider the rights of the players?  A ban on tattoo advertising 
arguably restricts the player’s freedom of expression or other 
personal liberty or privacy rights.  As discussed above, some 
boxers wear tattoo advertisements.  NBA players wear all kinds of 
visible tattoos on their arms and shoulders.  And one player, 
Shaquille O’Neal, even has a self-promoting “Superman” logo 
permanently tattooed on his arm.7  The NBA apparently has not 
expressed any concerns about these tattoos8—making a ban on 
 
announced it was considering a sponsorship agreement under which players would have a 
mobile telephone company’s logo temporarily tattooed on their arms.  While the club 
indicated that it intends to pursue the deal, the Australian Football League reportedly 
“was not amused and said it had knocked the concept back when approached in the past.” 
Rosanne Michie, Tattoo Idea is Crazy, Says AFL, SUNDAY HERALD SUN (Austl.), Dec. 19, 
2004, at 9. 
 3 See Hilary Cassidy, Roll (Dice) with the Punches: When an Online Casino Sends a 
Fighter into the Ring with its Ad Tattooed on His Back, He Upsets His Opponents, the 
Boxing Community and ESPN, BRANDWEEK, Dec. 9. 2002, at 22. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Matthew Futterman, NBA Paints its Own Picture on Tattoo Ads—Corporate Logos 
on Players Not Acceptable, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 21, 2001, at 067; 
Matthew Futterman, NBA: Union Takes Wait-and-See on Tattoos, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Mar. 22, 2001, at http://www.fiftyrubies.com/New%20Jersey%20Online-
%20Star-Ledger%20Sports.htm. 
 6 See Charlene E.M. Wilson, Corporate Tattoos Present Problem for NBA, Mar. 23, 
2001, at http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202001/NBATattoos.htm (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
 7 Eric Immerman, Jenny Jumping into Lake Show, at http://sports.espn.go.com/-
espn/print?id=1477699&type=page2Story (last modified Dec. 18, 2002). 
 8 See generally Futterman, supra note 1. 
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tattoo advertising without a sound legal premise smack of 
hypocrisy and paternalism.  In addition, the NBA Players 
Association believes the league cannot unilaterally ban tattoo 
advertisement, but rather must resolve the issue through collective 
bargaining.9 
Here, applying First Amendment protection to a purely 
commercial form of expression like tattoo advertising would be a 
dubious extension of the law10 and the First Amendment may have 
little relevance to the NBA because the league is not a state actor.11  
The NBA also has lucrative sponsorship agreements with 
numerous corporations, allowing the sponsors to advertise in 
basketball arenas, at NBA events and during television broadcasts 
of NBA games.12  Various other companies pay television 
networks millions of dollars for exclusive rights to advertise during 
NBA game broadcasts.13  The NBA ostensibly selects sponsors in 
an effort to protect the league’s image.  Renegade tattoo 
advertisers peddling any variety of goods or services could take 
advantage of the goodwill the NBA enjoys in the marketplace and 
harm its image by giving the appearance that the advertisers or 
their products are affiliated with the NBA. 
This Article will explore the issue of tattoo advertising on NBA 
players.  Part I provides background information on tattoo 
advertisers campaigns to date.  Part II discusses ways in which 
 
 9 Walker, supra note 2. 
 10 See S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 
(1987) (stating that “[c]ommercial speech ‘receives a limited form of First Amendment 
protection’” (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 
(1986))). 
 11 See generally id. at 543–44 (holding that Congressional grant of charter to United 
States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) does not make the USOC a state actor); Goldberg 
v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (arguing in dicta 
that it is unlikely that the NBA is a government entity for First Amendment purposes); 
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that 
Congress’s grant of a federal antitrust exemption to Major League Baseball does not 
make the league a state actor). 
 12 Stefan Fatsis & Suzanne Vranica, NBA’s Rapid Action Following Brawl Earns 
Kudos from Major Advertisers, NAT’L POST (Can.), Nov. 24, 2004, at FP10; see Debbie 
Arrington, Ad Nauseam: Sponsors Rethink Their Support of NBA, Players, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 2004, at D08; Futterman, supra note 1 (reporting that Nestlé 
has paid millions to be the exclusive candy sponsor). 
 13 Fatsis & Vranica, supra note 12. 
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tattoo advertisers could unfairly capitalize on the goodwill of the 
NBA, and concludes that tattoo advertising is likely to confuse 
viewers into believing that the tattoo advertiser has a sponsorship 
agreement with, or is authorized by, the NBA.  Part II also 
analyzes the First Amendment implications of restricting players 
from wearing tattoo advertisements.  It argues that the NBA should 
not be considered a state actor, and that tattoo advertising is not 
protected speech.  Finally, Part III considers whether the NBA can 
unilaterally prohibit tattoo advertising, or whether such a 
restriction must be collectively bargained with the players’ union.  
The Article concludes that, under the National Labor Relations 
Act, the NBA is not required to negotiate its stance on tattoo 
advertising through collective bargaining.  Tattoo advertising may 
prove to be an interesting battle for the players and their lawyers, 
but ultimately it would be a losing one. 
I. THIS SKIN FOR RENT: THE HISTORY OF TATTOO ADVERTISING 
ON ATHLETES 
The furor over tattoo advertising began in September 2001 
when boxer Bernard “The Executioner” Hopkins wore a temporary 
tattoo on his back while defeating the favored Felix Trinidad.14  
GoldenPalace.com, an online casino, paid Hopkins about $100,000 
to have its internet address temporarily tattooed on his back in 
large block letters.15  The Nevada Athletic Commission (NAC) 
then stepped in and voted 5-0 to prohibit a second fighter, Clarence 
“Bones” Adams, from wearing a temporary GoldenPalace.com 
tattoo on his back during a fight against Paulie Ayala.16  The 
NAC’s decision was based on three factors: (1) that the tattoos 
could distract judges; (2) that the ink might get into the opponent’s 
 
 14 See Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22 (“The body art . . . generated a swirl of controversy 
over the rights of boxers to control their images and a network’s ability to protect its 
interests—while generating a roundhouse punch of publicity for the company.”); Walker, 
supra note 2 (The henna tattoo in this first fight started coming off after Hopkins began 
sweating during the fight.  Nevertheless, GoldenPalace.com signed a long-term deal to 
apply henna tattoos for subsequent fights). 
 15 Walker, supra note 2. 
 16 George Kimball, Boxing Notes; Tattoo Needle; Fighters Left Flat on Backs, BOSTON 
HERALD, May 19, 2002, at B23. 
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eyes; and (3) that tattoo advertisements are demeaning to the sport 
of boxing.17  Adams sought a temporary restraining order against 
the NAC, which a Clark County District Court granted.18  In 
March 2002, the Clark County District Court granted a preliminary 
injunction against the NAC, stating that while the Government 
does have an interest in preventing the distraction of boxing judges 
during a fight, distraction has not been shown and a banning of the 
temporary markings does not materially advance the 
Commission’s interest.19  The judge further held that “the ban was 
a violation of the boxers’ First Amendment rights and therefore 
could not be enforced.”20  Subsequently, “Bones” Adams and other 
boxers have fought with temporary GoldenPalace.com tattoos on 
their backs.21  Cash-strapped former celebrities Todd Bridges, 
Danny Bonaduce, and Tonya Harding22 also jumped into the tattoo 
advertising fray, each sporting GoldenPalace.com tattoos on their 
backs during Fox Television’s “Celebrity Boxing” show.23  
According to GoldenPalace.com, the celebrities were each paid in 
the “low five figures.”24  Over fifteen million viewers in the United 
States saw the program on Fox, and visitors to the 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 Press Release, GoldenPalace.com, GoldenPalace.com to Help Fund Retired Boxers 
Foundation (July 10, 2002), at http://goldenpalaceevents.com/sports/retired01.php 
(hereinafter Golden Palace Press Release).  According to GoldenPalace.com’s attorney, 
“the judge found that the ban was an improper ‘ad hoc’ regulation, and that it was an 
‘overbroad’ infringement of free speech in violation of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 19 Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. 02-A-446674-C, 2002 WL 1967500 (Nev. 
Dist. Ct. Mar. 6, 2002). 
 20 See Golden Palace Press Release, supra note 18; W.H. Stickney Jr., Body Language 
All the Rage, HOUS. CHRON., June 2, 2002, at 4. 
 21 See Golden Palace Press Release, supra note 18.  GoldenPalace.com tattooed over 
thirty fighters between September 19, 2001 and July 10, 2002. Id.  According to one 
sports commentator, “Happily, for true boxing fans, Paulie Ayala tattooed Bones’ face 
and belly with his gloves [during their boxing match].” Mike O’Callaghan, Smile, Don’t 
Fight, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 15, 2002, at 19. 
 22 Of “Diff’rent Strokes,” “The Partridge Family,” and figure-skater-who-hired-a-
hitman-to-smash-Nancy-Kerrigan’s-kneecap fame, respectively. James Poniewozik, 
Celebrity Boxing is a Stiff, TIME MAG., May 14, 2002, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/columnist/poniewozik/article/0,9565,217249,00.html. 
 23 Michael McCarthy, Ad Tattoos Get under Some People’s Skin, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 
2002, at B03. 
 24 Id. 
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GoldenPalace.com web site reportedly rose 200% in the twenty-
four hour period following the show.25 
While the boxers pocketed the money, ESPN fumed.26  In the 
spring of 2002, the sports network announced that it would 
prohibit fighters from wearing temporary tattoos in fights shown 
on its ESPN or ESPN2 channels.27  It received an assurance from 
junior middleweight Kassim Ouma, as well as his manager, that 
the boxer would not wear a tattoo during his May 10, 2002 fight 
against Jason Papillion.28  However, come fight time, Ouma and 
Papillion both revealed GoldenPalace.com tattoos on their backs.29  
ESPN responded by fining the fight promoter $10,000 and 
threatening never to broadcast an Ouma fight on its network 
again.30  Fox Sports also reportedly told promoters it would not 
allow tattoo advertising on its boxing programs.31 
A. Tattoo Advertising and the NBA 
Rumors that NBA players planned to wear tattoo 
advertisements circulated even before boxers began sporting them.  
A New York City marketing executive, Dakkan Abbe, contacted 
several NBA players in March 2001 to propose that they wear 
 
 25 Id.  GoldenPalace.com has paid “streakers” at sports events to tattoo their backs as 
well.  Most famously, a man wearing nothing but a temporary tattoo on his chest ran onto 
the field at the Super Bowl—the National Football League’s championship game—in 
February 2004. Super Ads?, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at 14.  The web site reportedly saw 
an immediate 380% jump in web traffic. Id.  More recently, GoldenPalace.com paid 
$28,000 in an eBay.com online auction for a partially eaten, ten-year-old grilled cheese 
sandwich with what the seller claimed was a likeness of the Virgin Mary visible on the 
toasted bread. Sandwich with Image of Mary Draws $28,000; Grilled Cheese Sold on 
eBay Sparks Other Lookalike Items, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at 4. 
 26 Liz Mullen, Boxer’s Tattoo Gets Underneath ESPN’s Skin, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 5, 2002, available at http://goldenpalaceevents.com/sports-
/tattoo01.php. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Bernard Fernandez, Cease Fire, But Watch Your Back, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 
2002, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/dailynews/2002/08/27/sports-
/3945726.htm?1c; see also Bob Raissman, TV’s Fight Foe: Tattoos, Inc., N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, May 14, 2002, at 53. 
 29 Fernandez, supra note 28. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Raissman, supra note 28. 
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tattoo advertisements.32  Abbe reportedly planned a sneak attack 
for Sunday, April 1, 2001, when players were to wear tattoo ads in 
games between the Orlando Magic and the Detroit Pistons, the 
Indiana Pacers and the Philadelphia 76ers, and the New York 
Knicks and the Los Angeles Lakers.33  When the NBA heard about 
the plan, it prohibited tattoo ads on the grounds that players are not 
allowed to advertise products on the playing court.34  Abbe initially 
had Rasheed Wallace, then a forward for the Portland Trailblazers, 
interested, but Wallace later rejected the idea.35  According to 
Wallace’s agent, “His decision had nothing to do with the league’s 
position.  He decided not to do it because he didn’t want to detract 
from his current tattoos.  He didn’t want to become a billboard.”36  
Abbe claimed the NBA scared players off.37 
The Players Association decided to bide its time to see if a 
player wearing a tattoo would be fined or suspended by the 
league.38  No player has taken this risk, so the issue remains 
hypothetical and the NBA’s stated position remains untested.39 
 
 32 Roscoe Nance, Marketer Hopes NBA Players Will Agree to Temporary Ad Tattoos, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2001, at C06. 
 33 Fred Robinson, Tattoos Used as Advertisement Not Welcome, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), Apr. 1, 2001, at Sports p.2. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Nance, supra note 32. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Adam Rubin, Tattoos Used as Ads Have Drawn NBA’s Ire, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 
22, 2001, at 80. 
 38 See Futterman, supra note 5. 
 39 Id. Richard “Rip” Hamilton of the Detroit Pistons came closest to challenging the 
rule when he had his hair braided to match the tread pattern of a Goodyear tire.  He 
debuted the hairdo on January 31, 2005 in a game against the New York Knicks.  
Goodyear paid Hamilton an undisclosed amount of money—and gave him a new set of 
tires—to wear his hair in the tire tread pattern for a week. Goodyear Endorsement Deal 
Goes Straight to Piston Player’s Head, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 3, 2005, at E02; Scott 
Soshnick, Pistons’ Hamilton Heads Up Tire Ad: Goodyear Pays Detroit Star to Wear His 
Hairstyle Like Its Automobile Tread, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.detnews.com/2005/autosinsider/0502/01/C01-76155.htm.  A Goodyear 
spokesman announced that the company chose Hamilton because “the way he plays fits 
nicely with the product—confident maneuvering, handles well in all conditions.”  
Overtime, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Ind.), Feb. 8, 2005, at 4B.  Hamilton’s tread-head (and 
Goodyear’s puns) received mixed reviews from the public. Dwain Price, Rudy T Exits 
Amid Reminders that He’s Truly One of the Good Guys, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, 
Feb. 6, 2005, at C6.  The NBA did not comment publicly. 
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B. Current NBA Rules Potentially Applicable to Tattoo 
Advertising 
NBA players face a wholly different set of issues than do 
boxers with respect to tattoo advertising: boxers compete 
individually, have no “boss,” are not part of a league,40 and for the 
most part negotiate their contracts on a fight-by-fight basis.41  The 
sport is governed by individual state boxing commissions.42  On 
the other hand, NBA players compete in teams under the 
leadership of coaches, a general manager, and a team owner.43  
Players are members of a league, receive regular salaries, and often 
have performance-based incentive clauses included in multi-year 
contracts.44  All NBA players are members of a players’ union and 
are subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and 
NBA Rules.45 
Neither the NBA’s CBA nor the Uniform Player Contract 
(“UPC”) directly addresses tattoo advertising.46  The NBA 
primarily bases its tattoo ad ban on provisions that grant the NBA 
Commissioner the authority to enforce the “best interests” of the 
league.47  For example, a UPC provision on player conduct states: 
“The Player agrees . . . not to do anything that is materially 
detrimental or materially prejudicial to the best interests of the 
Team or the League.”48  Similarly, a UPC clause governing player 
 
 40 See Jioni Palmer, Ready for a House Fight, NEWSDAY, Jan. 9, 2005, at A08. 
 41 Jack Newfield, Teamsters Ring Bell, N.Y. SUN, May 7, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.boxersunion.org/news/bn_030507_1.htm. 
 42 Palmer, supra note 40; see also Tim Lueckenhoff, Understanding the Association of 
Boxing Commissions, at http://www.secondsout.com/Ringside/business.cfm?ccs=356-
&cs=9836 (discussing the business of boxing) (last viewed Mar. 14, 2005). 
 43 Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://www.nbpa.com/aboutus/nbpafaq.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005); see Official 
Rules of the NBA, Rule No. 3-Players, Substitutes and Coaches, available at 
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
 44 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VII, § 3, http://www.nbpa.com-
/cba/cba.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
 45 Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, supra note 43; see also Official Rules of the NBA, 
supra note 43. 
 46 See generally NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Exhibit A, NBA Uniform 
Player Contract [hereinafter NBA UPC], http://www.nbpa.com/cba/exhibits/exhibitA-
.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
 47 Id. § 5(b). 
 48 Id. 
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promotional activities provides: “The Player agrees that . . . he will 
not . . . sponsor commercial products without the written consent 
of the Team, which shall not be withheld except in the reasonable 
interests of the Team or the NBA.”49  Further, the CBA provision 
on player uniforms is arguably broad enough to apply to tattoo 
advertisements, stating: 
During any NBA game or practice, including warm-up 
periods and going to and from the locker room to the 
playing floor, a player shall wear only the Uniform as 
supplied by his Team.  For purposes of the preceding 
sentence only, “Uniform” means all clothing and other 
items (such as kneepads, wristbands and headbands, but not 
including Sneakers) worn by a player during an NBA game 
or practice. ‘Sneakers’ means athletic shoes of the type 
worn by players while playing an NBA game.50 
Finally, the NBA Constitution, which is incorporated into the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, authorizes the league 
Commissioner to fine “[a]ny Player who gives, makes, issues, 
authorizes or endorses any statement having, or designed to have, 
an effect prejudicial or detrimental to the best interests of 
basketball or of the Association or of a Member or its 
Team . . . .”51 
 
 49 Id. § 13(b). 
 50 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 44, art. XXXVII (“Group 
Licensing Rights”), § 3. 
 51 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Exhibits, Excerpt from NBA Constitution, § 
35(c), http://www.nbpa.com/cba/exhibits/exhibitA-excerpt.html (last visited Mar. 14, 
2005).  Two successive provisions of the NBA Constitution also give the Commissioner 
broad power to fine or suspend players for misconduct.  Section 35(d) states: 
If in the opinion of the Commissioner any other act or conduct of a Player at or 
during an Exhibition, Regular Season, or Playoff game has been prejudicial to 
or against the best interests of the Association or the game of basketball, the 
Commissioner shall impose upon such Player a fine . . . or may order for a time 
the suspension of any such Player . . . or he may order both such fine and 
suspension. 
Section 35(e) states: “The Commissioner shall have the power to suspend for a definite or 
indefinite period, or to impose a fine . . . or inflict both such suspension and fine upon 
any Player who, in his opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct . . . that is prejudicial or 
detrimental to the Association.” 
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Presumably, the NBA Commissioner could decide that tattoo 
advertising is detrimental to the best interests of the league if such 
advertisements conflict with league sponsors or anger networks 
televising NBA games.  Nevertheless, for Dakkan Abbe, the 
marketing executive, the controversy boils down to free speech.52  
For athletes like boxer Kassim Ouma, wearing a tattoo ad means 
added income.53  But for ESPN and the NBA, tattoo ads represent 
lost revenue and strained relations with league sponsors and loyal 
advertisers.54 
II. PROHIBITING TATTOO ADVERTISING 
The NBA has used the “best interests” language in the CBA to 
impose fines and suspensions on players, coaches, and even team 
owners who criticize the league or the officials during media 
interviews.55  Those restrictions, however, are arguably more 
justifiable than a ban on tattoo advertising.  Criticizing game 
 
 52 According to Abbe, “How can the NBA mandate what goes on your skin? . . . To me, 
it’s no different than a sneaker contract.” Elliot Harris, Almost Famous; NBA Wants to 
Can this Marketing Plan, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 26, 2001, at 93.  Further, Abbe believes 
there is a cultural divide between NBA executives and NBA players, such that “[t]he 
league has freaked out over the issue of tattoos. If they’re uncomfortable with tattoos, 
they have to come to terms with it. . . . [The NBA] would like everyone to be like 
Michael Jordan, no tattoos, never say anything controversial, sell the right products.” 
Robinson, supra note 33 (alterations in original). 
 53 According to Ouma, “If I can make a little extra money by putting an ad on my 
back, . . .  it’s nobody’s business except for mine.” Raissman, supra note 28.  NBA player 
Kendall Gill agreed in 2002: “I’d do it for the right price. . . .  This is a business.  You’ve 
got to take advantage of your opportunities.” Tom Verducci, The Rites of Spring: The 
Only Ones Who Need Preseason Training are the Fans, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 18, 
2002, at 25. 
 54 According to an ESPN spokesman: 
What’s to stop a fighter from coming in the ring with Budweiser on his 
back? . . . You’re Miller and you’re sponsoring the entire show and someone is 
in the ring for thirty minutes with “Budweiser” on his back.  Is Miller going to 
continue to pay ESPN to support the show with this stuff going on? 
Kimball, supra note 16. 
 55 Geoffrey C. Arnold, Raw’sheed Rasheed Wallace Cares, Just Not About Fans’ 
Feelings or the NBA, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 11, 2003, at D01.  The NBA also has a 
mandatory suspension policy for players who leave the team bench area during a fight 
between players, regardless of whether or not the player leaving the bench contributes to 
the fight.  The league may also fine the player up to $20,000 for the infraction.  Rod 
Beaton, New Wave of Brawls Concerns Baseball, USA TODAY, June 23, 2003, at C8. 
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officials in the media casts doubt on the integrity of the game, 
personally insults officials, and unduly antagonizes or intimidates 
officials in future games, thereby harming the integrity of the 
league.  However, tattoo advertising would not typically harm 
anyone directly involved in the game of basketball. 
A much more viable claim by the NBA would be rooted in the 
financial harm to the league and its business partners, resulting 
from infringement on intellectual property rights. 
A. False Advertising and Unfair Competition 
Tattoo advertising can best be compared to what is known as 
“ambush marketing”—a practice whereby companies attempt to 
make the consumer think their product or service is somehow 
affiliated with a popular sporting event or league.56  The “ambush 
marketer’s” goal is to capitalize on the goodwill of the sport, 
league, or event without receiving authorization from the event 
organizer.57  Common examples include giving away free tickets to 
an event through sweepstakes or contests, sponsoring individual 
teams or athletes, buying commercial time prior to or during event 
broadcasts, or flying a banner over an outdoor stadium.58 
Similarly, the company employing an athlete to wear a tattoo 
advertisement avoids paying advertising and sponsorship fees to 
 
 56 See Lori L. Bean, Note, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confusion and the 
Lanham Act, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1995). 
 57 Id.; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 27:66 (4th ed. 2003). 
 58 See Bean, supra note 56, at 1100, 1103, 1105.  One example includes the 1992 
Winter Olympic Games, during which Visa paid the International Olympic Committee 
(“IOC”) $20 million for the right to serve as the official credit card of the Olympic 
Games.  However, American Express bought substantial advertising time on the major 
television networks.  While American Express did not use the Olympic logo or name, it 
made generic references to “winter fun and games.” Id. at 1103.  Another example is 
from the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles.  Converse was an official 
sponsor of the Games, but Nike ran a concurrent ad campaign with an “I Love L.A.” 
theme. Id. at 1104.  Yet another example is a contest Pepsi promoted in 1990 called the 
“Diet Pepsi $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool.” Id. at 1108.  Pepsi ran an extensive 
advertising campaign for the contest during the National Hockey League (“NHL”) 
Stanley Cup Playoffs, but never used the name or logo of the NHL.  Coca-Cola was the 
NHL’s official sponsor. Id. at 1108. 
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the league or to the television broadcaster.59  Yet that company 
benefits by reaching large audiences watching NBA games on 
television.  While such a practice may seem unethical or 
underhanded, it is—in its pure form—entirely legal.60  Problems 
could arise, however, where consumers are deceived or confused 
into thinking that the event organizer endorses the ambush 
marketer, or that the two entities have some sort of relationship.61  
This is where the “victim,” such as the NBA, might be able to turn 
to the Lanham Act to assert a false advertising claim.62 
1. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
In drafting the federal trademark statute, and § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act in particular, Congress had a dual intent: (1) to protect 
trademark owners from having their marks misappropriated by 
others,63 and (2) to protect consumers, so that they “may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular 
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which 
it asks for and wants to get.”64  Thus, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
holds liable: 
(1) Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of 
 
 59 See Stephen M. McKelvey, Commercial “Branding”: The Final Frontier of False 
Start for Athletes’ Use of Temporary Tattoos as Body Billboards, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF SPORT 1, 18 (2003). 
 60 According to one commentator: 
The difficulty with ambush marketing is that the law is on the side of the 
ambushers.  Purely defined, ambush marketing does not involve counterfeiting 
or the illegal use of trademarks, tradenames or symbols.  Companies simply 
develop a creative advertising campaign around the event, never use the event 
logo, trademark or tradename and capitalize by association with the event 
without paying for official sponsor status. 
Robert N. Davis, Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 430 
(1996). 
 61 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2002). 
 62 See generally id. § 1125. 
 63 Bean, supra note 56, at 1111 (citing Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Rep. on S. 1883, 
S. Rep. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577, 5580). 
 64 Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274). 
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origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another 
person . . . . 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s 
goods, services, or commercial activities . . . .65 
Notably, the Act does not require that the confusing or 
misleading “word, term, name, symbol, or device” be 
trademarked.66  The Act can be used to target a wide range of false 
or misleading advertising, and not just misrepresentation of an 
existing mark.67 
Therefore, were Twizzlers to launch a tattoo advertising 
campaign on the biceps of NBA players, the NBA or its sponsor, 
Nestlé, could bring a claim under § 43(a) against Twizzlers and its 
parent company, Hershey Foods.68  The NBA or Nestlé could 
claim likelihood of confusion—not between the Twizzlers and 
NBA/Nestlé marks, but rather “confusion [or deception] as to the 
affiliation . . . or sponsorship, or approval”69 of Twizzlers’ product 
by the NBA or Nestlé.70  The cause of action would require 
proving the following six elements: 
 
 65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 66 See Bean, supra note 56, at 1111 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 69 See id. 
 70 Tattoo advertising can also be compared to virtual advertising—whereby advertisers 
superimpose computer-generated advertisements into the scenery in sports broadcasts so 
that the advertisement is visible to television viewers, but not to those attending the game.  
According to one commentator: 
[I]t is arguable that sports venues which do not grant athletic teams or 
television broadcasters approval to place virtual ads in the venue may have 
standing to bring § 43(a) claims because the ads: 1) falsely suggest that the 
VUKELJ 6/2/2005  2:45 PM 
2005] CAN THE NBA PROHIBIT TATTOO ADVERTISEMENTS? 521 
(1) defendant has made a statement about a product which is 
false, misleading, or is likely to cause confusion; 
(2) the statement was made in a commercial or promotional 
context (in connection with goods or services); 
(3) the advertised goods travel in or affect interstate 
commerce; 
(4) a possibility of deception of a substantial segment of the 
target audience exists; 
(5) the deception is likely to affect purchasing decisions 
(materiality); and 
(6) there is a likelihood that plaintiff will be injured as a 
result of the ad.71 
While the first element would be most difficult to prove, it is 
important to note that the Lanham Act does not target only literally 
false representations.72  Rather, the Act is designed to protect 
consumers as to source, origin, or sponsorship of a product or 
service.73 
a) Likelihood of Confusion 
In order to show that a defendant tattoo advertiser’s use of a 
word or symbol “is likely to cause confusion,” the NBA would 
 
venues endorse or are affiliated with the advertised products; and 2) the virtual 
ads negatively affect the venues’ business of selling ad space on venue 
property.  In addition, a sponsor forced to compete with virtual advertisements 
may have standing to assert § 43(a) claims where: 1) a virtual ad is misleading 
because the public perceives that the virtual ad is physically in place at the 
sports venue and is associated with the venue; and 2) the virtual ad causes 
commercial injury to the sponsor by reducing the value of the sponsor’s ad at 
the park. 
Theresa A. McEvilly, Comment, Virtual Advertising in Sports Venues & The Federal 
Lanham Act § 43(a): Revolutionary Technology Creates Controversial Advertising 
Medium, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 603, 619 (1998). 
 71 Id. at 619–20 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:13); see also Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19 F.3d 
125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting likelihood of confusion claim where consumer surveys 
did not prove that a substantial number of consumers were misled). 
 72 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
 73 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
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need to conduct a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis.74  
Courts have articulated a multi-factor test for likelihood of 
confusion: 
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the 
alleged infringing mark; 
(2) the strength of the owner’s mark; 
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the 
care and attention expected of consumers when making a 
purchase; 
(4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark 
without evidence of actual confusion arising; 
(5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 
(6) the evidence of actual confusion; 
(7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed 
through the same channels of trade and advertised through 
the same media; 
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts 
are the same; 
(9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers 
because of the similarity of function . . . .75 
For purposes of an ambush marketing case, factors four 
through nine are the most relevant.  With respect to factors four 
and six, the NBA could present evidence of actual confusion 
among viewers that defendant’s mark was actually endorsed or 
sponsored by the NBA.  For example, this evidence could take the 
form of consumer surveys showing that consumers thought 
Twizzlers was an officially endorsed snack of the NBA, and not 
endorsed merely by the player wearing the tattoo advertisement.  A 
 
 74 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:18. 
[U]nder the Lanham Act [§ 43(a)] the ultimate test is whether the public is 
likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks. . . . Whether 
we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of 
origin, the test is identical—is there a “likelihood of confusion”? 
Id. (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 
1979)). 
 75 Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983). 
VUKELJ 6/2/2005  2:45 PM 
2005] CAN THE NBA PROHIBIT TATTOO ADVERTISEMENTS? 523 
showing that consumers believe the NBA approves of the player’s 
on-court endorsement of the product, or that the tattoo 
advertisement harms the league’s reputation, could be enough to 
show confusion.76  While evidence of actual confusion could be 
highly persuasive in the NBA’s favor, courts recognize that 
showing actual confusion is difficult, especially where a plaintiff is 
trying to enjoin a defendant from a marketing practice.77  If the 
NBA acts quickly enough, there may not be time for actual harm 
or confusion to take hold.78 
The fifth factor—the intent of the defendant in adopting the 
mark—would likely weigh in favor of the NBA.  The tattoo 
advertiser clearly undertakes the campaign in order to expose its 
mark to a large audience via NBA telecasts.  Evidence that the 
defendant intended to make consumers think that its product is an 
official sponsor of the NBA could be especially helpful for the 
NBA.  The league would want to show to the greatest extent 
possible that the defendant tattoo advertiser was trying to capitalize 
on the goodwill surrounding the NBA name and logo, and the 
goodwill of those names and marks associated with the NBA as 
official sponsors.79 
 
76 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 77 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“‘[I]t is black letter law that actual confusion need not be shown to prevail under the 
Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Act requires only a 
likelihood of confusion as to source.’”) (quoting Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 78 The example of a Twizzlers tattoo advertising campaign especially lends itself to 
confusion among consumers.  The average basketball fan probably does not know which 
company manufactures Twizzlers.  One might assume, when seeing a Twizzlers logo 
tattooed on a player’s arm, that Twizzlers is produced by Nestlé, the NBA’s official 
sponsor. 
 79 Goodwill is a business value that reflects the basic human propensity to continue 
doing business with a seller who has offered goods and services that the customer likes 
and has found adequate to fulfill his needs. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 
1109, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999).  According to one commentator: “Goodwill is not to be 
simply equated with reputation.  It includes, but connotes more than, good credit, 
honesty, fair name and reliability. . . . Because goodwill is merely a concept, it requires 
perceptible symbols, e.g., trademarks and trade names, for its survival.” LOUIS ALTMAN, 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 1:11 (4th ed. 
2001) (citations omitted).   
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Factors seven, eight, and nine of the likelihood of confusion 
analysis could also weigh in the NBA’s favor.  The signage and 
logos of the NBA’s official sponsors, as well as those of tattoo 
advertisers, would be seen through the same medium—during 
basketball telecasts potentially viewed by a national audience.80  
As such, the targets of the advertising are the same.  Finally, if the 
consumer is aware that the NBA has numerous endorsement 
contracts with goods and services providers, the consumer could 
reasonably assume that a mark displayed during a basketball game 
is an official sponsor of the NBA or has some endorsement from 
the league or a specific team. 
b) Other Elements of a § 43(a) Cause of Action 
After showing likelihood of confusion, the NBA still must 
show that: (a) the defendant’s misleading or confusing use of its 
tattoo advertisement was made in a commercial or promotional 
context; (b) the advertised goods travel in or affect interstate 
commerce; (c) a possibility of deception of a substantial segment 
of the target audience exists; (d) the deception is likely to affect 
purchasing decisions; and (e) there is a likelihood that plaintiff will 
be injured as a result of the tattoo advertisement.81 
 
 80 See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Sprint Commun. Co., No. 94 CIV. 1051, 1994 WL 
97097 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1994).  In this case, MasterCard sought to enjoin Sprint from 
distributing calling cards bearing the 1994 World Cup Soccer Tournament logo.  
MasterCard had signed an exclusive agreement with the World Cup as a provider of 
“card-based payment and account access device[s]” bearing the World Cup mark. Id. at 
*1.  Even though Sprint had rights to use the World Cup logo as a result of signing on as 
the official long-distance telephone carrier of the World Cup, and even though the calling 
card did not have a magnetic stripe, the court enjoined Sprint from distributing calling 
cards with the World Cup logo because of the likelihood of confusion between the Sprint 
calling card and the MasterCard credit card. See generally id.  Where a league sponsor 
and the tattoo advertiser are competitors, the NBA or an official sponsor could use the 
MasterCard case to argue that because the sponsor has exclusive game time advertising 
rights for a particular product, any other advertising in an NBA arena, or shown during an 
NBA telecast, is likely to confuse viewers by making them think there is an association 
between the tattoo advertiser and the NBA or television network.  The analogy is limited, 
however, by the fact that unlike a tattoo advertising case, MasterCard and Sprint both 
incorporated the World Cup mark into their products, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
confusion. 
 81 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
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The commercial nature of tattoo advertising is obvious.  The 
“interstate commerce” requirement is also easy to satisfy.82  Even 
if a local company that did business in only one state paid a player 
to wear a tattoo advertisement, its goods or services would be 
advertised in multiple television markets in two or more states, and 
thus the tattoo would be found likely to “affect” interstate 
commerce.83 
The possibility of deception would have been addressed, in 
part, through the likelihood of confusion analysis.  This element 
would require a showing by the NBA that the average NBA 
viewer, when seeing a tattoo advertisement on a player’s arm, 
would assume that there was a relationship between the advertiser 
and the NBA.84  Presumably, an association with the NBA is 
meant to affect purchasing decisions, such that NBA fans will buy 
a product endorsed by the league. 
Finally, the NBA could show two forms of injury: (1) breach of 
exclusive rights sponsorship contracts with legitimate sponsors, or 
(2) harm to the NBA’s reputation by association with the tattoo 
advertiser.85  Under the first form of injury, the NBA could suffer 
monetary losses as a result of legitimate sponsors who, angered by 
the tattoo advertising campaign, might abandon their agreements 
 
 82 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). 
 83 See, e.g., id. at 125 (stating that even local activity of growing wheat on a private 
farm falls under the Commerce Clause as substantially affecting interstate commerce 
because such activity influences price of wheat in the overall wheat market); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (holding that travel, 
regardless of the nature of the trip, affects interstate commerce, and thus racial 
discrimination by a motel, which deters travelers, can be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1957) (explaining 
that the business of professional football affects interstate commerce). 
 84 See, e.g., Zelinsky v. Columbia 300 Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that competitor’s use of trademarked bowling balls caused actual confusion); Mattel Inc. 
v. Robarb’s Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 487, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that defendant’s 
collectible car display caused “substantial confusion” with plaintiff’s Hot Wheels cars). 
 85 See, e.g., Hospitality Int’l Inc. v. Mahtani, No. 2:97CV87, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16445, at **64–65 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 1998) (holding that defendant’s use of exclusive 
mark of Plaintiff was a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and plaintiff was entitled to 
the remedies provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)  (holding that defendant damaged 
plaintiff’s reputation where actresses in defendant’s pornographic film were shown 
wearing uniforms similar to those normally associated with plaintiff). 
VUKELJ 6/2/2005  2:45 PM 
526 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:507 
with the NBA because of a breach of exclusivity rights.  This form 
of injury would be most likely where the tattoo advertiser is a 
direct competitor of an official NBA sponsor.  The second form of 
injury could apply whether or not the tattoo advertiser directly 
competes with an NBA sponsor.  Courts have stated that harm to 
reputation is an actionable form of injury.86  The NBA could claim 
that the tattoo advertiser, simply by associating itself with the 
league, is casting a negative shadow upon the league.  However, 
this would not apply to an innocuous product like Twizzlers. 
2. The Tattoo Advertiser’s Defense 
The tattoo advertiser could defend on the grounds that there is 
no likelihood of confusion between its mark and that of the NBA.  
There is no law against aggressive marketing, and no precedent 
exists for holding a marketer liable for this type of activity.  As one 
commentator has stated, “The difficulty [for sporting event 
organizers] with ambush marketing is that the law is on the side of 
the ambushers.  Purely defined, ambush marketing does not 
involve counterfeiting or the illegal use of trademarks, tradenames 
or symbols.”87  It could be argued that ambush marketing—in 
whatever form it is carried out—is in fact good for consumers.  It 
informs them of more available products and services, and denies 
the granting of an advertising monopoly in a forum that should be 
open to more than one advertiser.  Rather than confusing the 
consumer, it can expose the consumer to a greater number of 
products.  The tattoo advertisement is not replacing or displacing 
an official sponsor’s ad.  Rather, it is merely adding to the swirl of 
marketing that already exists in professional sports. 
 
 86 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d at 205 (“The trademark laws are 
designed not only to prevent consumer confusion but also to protect ‘the synonymous 
right of a trademark owner to control his product’s reputation.’”) (quoting James 
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 87 Davis, supra note 60, at 430. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:66 (stating that 
“[i]n the event a misleading impression is created, a violation of § 43(a) can be triggered” 
by an ambush marketing campaign). 
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The only case thus far directly addressing ambush advertising 
is National Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd.88  As a 
decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Canada), it 
carries no weight in the United States, but it could indicate how 
U.S. courts are likely to rule on a tattoo advertising case.  The case 
involved a promotional contest Pepsi ran in Canada, called the 
“Diet Pepsi $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool.”89  The contest 
was heavily advertised during the 1990 National Hockey League 
(“NHL”) Stanley Cup Playoffs, and Pepsi obtained the “right to be 
the exclusive advertiser of soft drinks during the broadcast of all 
‘Hockey Night in Canada’ games” televised by the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation.90  Coca-Cola had entered into a $2.6 
million agreement with the NHL in the spring of 1989 to serve as 
an official league sponsor, but it did not obtain rights to advertise 
during NHL game broadcasts in Canada.91  Pepsi avoided using the 
NHL logo or name, instead adopting a generic phrase, “Pro 
Hockey Playoff Pool.”92 
The NHL claimed that “the Contest and particularly the 
television advertisements . . . [were] likely to convey to the public 
a false impression that the N.H.L. and its members approved, 
authorized, endorsed, or were in some manner associated with the 
Contest, and thereby, the defendant’s products.”93  Further, the 
NHL asserted, “‘Pro Hockey Playoff’ could only have been 
intended to be a reference to the Stanley Cup playoff series . . . 
[and the contest] involved an infringement of [the NHL’s] 
registered trade marks or, alternatively, was an unlawful 
interference with their business relations with Coke.”94 
Pepsi acknowledged that it purposely tried to gain “the greatest 
possible commercial advantage from the publicity the defendant’s 
 
 88 92 D.L.R. 4th 349 (B.C. 1992); see also Davis, supra note 60, at 431–34 (discussing 
the British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Nat’l Hockey League); Bean, supra note 
56, at 1108–09 (also discussing Nat’l Hockey League). 
 89 Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 352–57. 
 90 Davis, supra note 60, at 432–33 (quoting Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 
354). 
 91 Id. at 432. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See generally Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 356. 
 94 Id. at 356–57. 
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products would receive during the Stanley Cup playoffs,” and that 
its contest “intended to refer to the N.H.L. teams.”95  However, 
Pepsi claimed it was not attempting to indicate that its products 
were “in any way approved, authorized, or endorsed by or 
associated with the plaintiffs.”96  Pepsi also denied infringement of 
the NHL’s marks and denied interference with the NHL’s business 
relationships.  “The Contest was, they submitted, nothing more 
than an aggressive but legitimate marketing campaign.”97 
The NHL provided survey evidence of consumer impressions 
that Pepsi was somehow affiliated with the NHL, but the court 
found the plaintiff’s evidence unconvincing.98  Ultimately, the 
court held: 
Certainly, the [NHL]-Coke agreement obligates [the NHL], 
so far as it is able, to protect the rights of Coke from 
‘ambush marketing.’  Such an obligation cannot, however, 
impose on a third party a duty to refrain from engaging in 
advertising its products in a manner which, although 
aggressive, is not, by the law of Canada, unlawful.99 
The Canadian court, therefore, refused to hold Pepsi liable.100 
Tattoo advertisers may also benefit from the fact that players 
are already allowed to sign independent endorsement deals—
perhaps making tattoo advertising merely a new, aggressive 
advertising technique in the existing scheme of player 
endorsement.101  Further, certain Major League Baseball 
 
 95 Id. at 357. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 360–65. 
 99 Id. at 369. 
 100 Id. at 372. 
 101 Despite the NBA’s exclusive sponsorship agreement with Coca-Cola, player 
Shaquille O’Neal has had an endorsement deal with Pepsi.  According to one 
commentator: 
Even though O’Neal did not wear a NBA uniform during his Pepsi commercial, 
one must ask whether the Pepsi-Cola advertising undermined Coca-Cola’s 
NBA sponsorship?  David Schreff, NBA Properties Vice President of Media 
and Sponsor Programs, stated that “[t]hat’s close to an ambush, . . . [b]ut we 
respect the rights of our players to go out and secure endorsement.” 
VUKELJ 6/2/2005  2:45 PM 
2005] CAN THE NBA PROHIBIT TATTOO ADVERTISEMENTS? 529 
(“MLB”)102 and National Football League (NFL)103 teams have 
successfully signed their own sponsorship agreements, despite very 
vocal complaints from the respective leagues that the team sponsor 
was in direct competition with a league sponsor. 
3. Distinguishing National Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola 
Canada Ltd. from Tattoo Advertising 
The facts of National Hockey League—and the practice of 
ambush marketing in general—are readily distinguishable from 
prospective tattoo advertising in the NBA.  Ambush marketing, as 
seen in National Hockey League, may be in some ways 
exploitative, but the division between the sport and the marketing 
 
Davis, supra note 60, at 427–28 (citing Geoffrey Brewer, Be Like Nike? Ambush 
Marketers Cash in on Major Events without Laying Out Enormous Sponsorship Fees; 
Should You Just Do It?, SALES & MARKETING MGMT., Sept. 1, 1993, at 66, 70). 
 102 The New York Yankees signed a sponsorship contract with Adidas in March 1997, 
despite the league’s exclusive sporting goods and apparel sponsorship agreement with 
Russell Athletic.  Adidas agreed to pay the Yankees $92 million over ten years for the 
right to advertise Adidas products in Yankee Stadium and to supply and include the 
Adidas logo on the team uniform.  Within one year, Adidas’ new North American sales 
had increased by sixty-six percent. See Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of 
Professional Sports’ League-Wide Licensing and Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J. 
SPORTS & L. 1, 6 n.18 (1999) (citations omitted).  MLB subsequently failed to sign Nike 
or Reebok to a sponsorship deal.  MLB owners reportedly turned down a $350 million 
deal offered by Nike, complaining that the sum was “paltry.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted). 
 103 In 1995, the Dallas Cowboys football club signed stadium endorsement agreements 
with Nike, Pepsi, Dr. Pepper, and American Express.  Through a series of agreements, 
the NFL’s licensing division, NFL Properties, had rights to all NFL club trademarks for 
commercial purposes, and all licensing revenue would be pooled and distributed equally 
to all clubs.  NFL Properties filed suit against the Dallas Cowboys Football Club for 
circumventing the agreements that obligated the team to share revenue from licensing of 
club trademarks. Timothy D. Watson, What’s “Love” Got to Do with It?: Potential 
Fiduciary Duties Among Professional Sports Team Owners, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 153, 155 
(2002).  At the time, Coca-Cola and Visa, competitors of Pepsi and American Express, 
were league sponsors of the NFL. Josh Dubow, Not Always Coca Cola, TIME, Sept. 6, 
1996 (noting that Coca Cola was a sponsor for the NFL), at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,7201,00.html; David Breitkopf, Visa 
Airs Olympics Teaser in Super Bowl Commercial, May 6, 2004 (noting that Visa is a 
sponsor for the NFL), at http://www.absolutebrand.com/newz/newz.asp?dismode-
=article&artid=154).  The Southern District of New York ruled that NFL Properties’ 
allegations were “sufficient to state a cause of action under the broad language of § 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act,” but the parties settled, allowing the Dallas Cowboys to keep its 
stadium sponsorships and to sign new ones. Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, 922 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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scheme is clear.  For instance, in National Hockey League, Pepsi 
never entered the playing arena and never used an NHL player to 
convey its message.104  With respect to an ambush marketer flying 
a banner over an open stadium, it may be even more obvious to the 
viewer that the marketer could not enter the stadium and thus was 
forced to resort to flying an airplane overhead.105 
However, tattoo advertising uses the actual instrumentalities of 
the game—the players—to carry and convey the advertisement.  A 
viewer cannot watch the game on television without also seeing the 
tattoo advertisements—all in the same camera shot during live 
action.  Consequently, there is little physical or visual separation 
between the game and the tattoo advertisement.  Such close 
association between the tattoo advertisement and the league in the 
viewer’s eye can create actionable harm to the league’s reputation.  
For instance, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd.,106 actresses in defendant’s pornographic film were 
shown wearing uniforms similar to those normally associated with 
plaintiff.  Asserting a Lanham Act claim based on harm to 
reputation, plaintiff argued that film viewers would associate 
plaintiff cheerleaders with the pornographic scenes in defendant’s 
film as a result of the similarity in costumes.  There was no 
evidence showing that a substantial number of viewers thought 
plaintiff produced, directed, approved or funded the pornographic 
film.  Nor was there any evidence that a substantial number of 
viewers were confused into believing that plaintiff cheerleaders 
performed in the film.  Regardless, the court found a likelihood of 
confusion based on “‘a tendency to impugn (the plaintiff’s 
services) and injure plaintiff’s business reputation.’”107 
Similarly, in the case of tattoo advertising, the NBA may not 
need to show that viewers believe the league formally participated 
in or approved the tattoo advertising campaign.  The use of a 
particularly distasteful tattoo advertisement, or general viewer 
 
 104 See generally Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th 349. 
 105 See generally Bean, supra note 56, at 1099–1103. 
106  604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). 
107   Id. at 204–05 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 
1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
VUKELJ 6/2/2005  2:45 PM 
2005] CAN THE NBA PROHIBIT TATTOO ADVERTISEMENTS? 531 
aversion to the practice of tattoo advertising,108 could create a 
negative association with the NBA.  Such harm to the league’s 
reputation is actionable. 
B. Is a Tattoo Advertising Prohibition Unconstitutional? 
The next question is whether the NBA’s concerns in protecting 
its image and goodwill can trump the free speech rights of the 
players.  The players would argue that a ban on tattoo advertising 
violates the First Amendment,109 just as a Nevada court reasoned 
when it enjoined the Nevada Athletic Commission from banning 
tattoo advertising during boxing matches.110  However, individuals 
can assert a First Amendment right to free speech only if those 
restricting them—i.e., the NBA, an individual team or a state 
boxing commission—are considered public entities or state 
actors.111  While a state boxing authority, such as the Nevada 
Athletic Commission, is likely a “public” entity,112 the relationship 
between the state and the NBA and individual NBA franchises is 
not as clear. 
 
108   Several commentators have criticized the practice of tattoo advertising in boxing. 
See, e.g., Royce Feour, Temporary Tattoos Don’t Belong in Fight Game, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J., Feb. 23, 2002, at 5C. 
 109 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
 110 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. 
 111 Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1998); 
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 112 The NAC is a division of Nevada’s Department of Business and Industry.  The 
Commission was established by act of the Nevada legislature, and it is responsible for 
“administer[ing] the State laws and regulations governing unarmed combat for the 
protection of the public and to ensure the health and safety of the contestants.” The NAC 
internet address (http://boxing.nv.gov) even has a governmental (“.gov”) internet domain 
extension. But see S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
543–44 (1987): 
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does not render the [U.S. 
Olympic Committee] a Government agent.  All corporations act under charters 
granted by a government, usually by a State.  They do not thereby lose their 
essentially private character.  Even extensive regulation by the government 
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the 
government. 
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1. Private Actors versus State Actors 
The Supreme Court has developed three tests for determining 
whether an entity can be considered a state actor: (1) the public 
function test; (2) the close nexus test; and (3) the symbiotic 
relationship test.113 
The public function test considers whether “the private entity 
has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State,’”114 and whether it performed a function 
that traditionally was under municipal control.115  However, merely 
performing a function which serves the public is not enough to 
make an entity a state actor.116 
The close nexus test is concerned with whether the state may 
be deemed responsible for the specific actions.117  The complaining 
party (i.e., the athlete) carries the burden of showing a sufficiently 
close nexus between the state and the challenged action (i.e., 
prohibition of tattoo ads) to establish that the state is 
responsible.118  Such a nexus normally will be found only where 
the state has coerced the private entity or encouraged it to such an 
extent that the private entity’s action “must be deemed that of the 
state.”119 
Finally, the symbiotic relationship test examines whether “the 
state has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence 
with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity . . . .’”120  A “combination of 
factors”—different in each case—can be used to show that the 
state and the private entity have an “interdependent and mutually 
beneficial relationship.”121  One element that carries much weight 
 
 113 See Karen Martin Dean, Note, Can the NBA Punish Dennis Rodman?  An Analysis of 
First Amendment Rights in Professional Basketball, 23 VT. L. REV. 157, 159–67 (1998). 
 114 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). 
 115 Dean, supra note 113, at 160 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)). 
 116 Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)). 
 117 Long v. Nat’l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101, 105 (1994) (citing Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). 
 118 Id.  (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 104 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). 
 121 Id. (discussing Burton, 365 U.S. 715). 
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in the test, though it is not dispositive, is a sharing of profits 
between the state and the private entity.122 
The NBA should not be considered a state actor under the 
public function test.  Organizing and operating a professional 
basketball league has never been considered a function of the 
state.123  Certainly, the NBA performs a public function, and the 
state arguably benefits from the presence of the NBA—both in the 
overall national economy, and in the revenue each team brings to 
its host city.  However, the operation of a professional basketball 
association is almost entirely a private function.124  Similarly, the 
NBA and its member teams should fail the close nexus test.  There 
is virtually no connection between the state and the NBA 
prohibition on tattoo advertising.  Nor is there any evidence to 
show that the state has pressured or encouraged the NBA in the 
formulation of its policy.125  Even the implementation of other 
NBA rules and initiatives which could be said to embody 
significant state interests—i.e., drug testing—are the result of 
league action in conjunction with the Players’ Association, with 
little influence or interference from the government.126 
One court addressed this very issue with respect to the NFL.127  
A former football player sued the NFL, the Pittsburgh Steelers, the 
City of Pittsburgh, and the mayor of the city following his 
suspension for anabolic steroid use.128  Plaintiff claimed that the 
 
 122 Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n, 760 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 123 Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(arguing in dicta that it is unlikely that the NBA is a government entity for First 
Amendment purposes). 
 124 Id. 
125   See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(holding that the federal antitrust exemption, which Congress granted to Major League 
Baseball, is not the “‘significant,’ active encouragement required to adequately link 
[Major League Baseball’s] actions to the federal government” for First and Fifth 
Amendment purposes) (citing S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 
483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987)). 
 126 See, e.g., Mike Wise, N.B.A. Finds Minimal Use of Marijuana in First Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at D1 (stating that 430 active players were randomly tested for 
marijuana, steroids, amphetamines, and LSD in the fall of 1999 pursuant to the league’s 
collective bargaining agreement, and that twelve out of the 430 players tested positive for 
marijuana). 
 127 See generally Long v. Nat’l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101 (1994). 
 128 Id. at 103. 
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mayor and the City of Pittsburgh “‘acquiesced and/or consented to, 
supported and upheld the conduct of” the NFL and the Pittsburgh 
Steelers football team.129  The court rejected plaintiff’s state action 
theory under the close nexus test, finding that neither the City nor 
the mayor “formulated the standards or controlled the decisions of 
the NFL or the Steelers.”130  Rather, plaintiff’s drug suspension 
was “based on independent medical conclusions and policy 
objectives of the [NFL], neither of which were influenced by the 
state.”131 
The argument for considering the NBA a state actor under the 
symbiotic relationship test is similarly weak.  The relevant 
question is whether there is a high level of interdependence 
between the state and the private entity.132  The interdependence in 
this case could be found primarily with respect to basketball 
arenas, many of which have received public financing.133  Such 
interdependence between the teams and the state involves one of 
the most fundamental aspects of the sport—the arenas in which the 
teams can play.  The very existence of some NBA teams might be 
in doubt without public financing.  This was the spirit driving the 
Stevens v. New York Racing Ass’n134 decision in which the court 
found a symbiotic relationship between the state and the New York 
Racing Association (“NYRA”), but rejected the existence of a 
close nexus between the two entities.135  The lawsuit arose from 
the NYRA’s refusal to allow plaintiff, a publisher of a newspaper 
about horse-racing, to take or appear in photographs at New York 
racetracks.136  The court considered several factors in holding that 
the NYRA and the state were interdependent, and thereby in a 
 
 129 Id. at 105. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.  The court continued: “Plaintiff fails to allege that the state in any way influenced 
or implemented the substance abuse policies adopted by the NFL by which plaintiff was 
suspended.” Id. 
 132 Id. at 104. 
 133 Dean, supra note 113, at 166–67 (1998).  It should be noted that Ms. Dean suggests 
the NBA would be found a state actor under the symbiotic relationship test, due to this 
interdependence. 
 134 665 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 135 Id. at 171–72. 
 136 Id. at 165. 
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symbiotic relationship.137  First, the NYRA was formed by the 
New York legislature.138  Second, state statute established what 
portion of race wagers go to the NYRA.139  Finally, after the 
NYRA covered its expenses, the law required it to pay almost the 
entire adjusted net income to the state in the form of a “franchise 
fee.”140 
Closer inspection, however, reveals major differences between 
the NBA and NYRA.  “[NYRA] was created under a law whose 
purpose, in part, was to enable the State to ‘derive reasonable 
revenue for the support of government.’”141  Further, “[NYRA] is 
merely a conduit through which money passes from the betting 
public to the state’s coffers.”142  This level of interdependence is 
far beyond that which exists between cities and NBA teams.  The 
only real similarity between NYRA and the NBA is that they both 
govern a sport.  If Stevens is to serve as a model for establishing 
interdependence between a sports organization and the state, it 
would only support the view that the NBA is not a state actor.143 
Another case addressing the issue is National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian.144  In a 5-4 majority, the Supreme 
Court held that a state university application of National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) rules does not make the NCAA’s 
 
 137 Id. at 172, 174–75. 
 138 Id. at 168, 172. 
 139 Id. at 169, 172. 
 140 Id. at 172. 
 141 Id. (quoting Halpern v. Lomenzo, 367 N.Y.S.2d 653, 660 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (quoting 
N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 9, ¶ 1). 
 142 Id. 
 143 But see Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a 
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 607 (2001) (using Stevens to show that “if a player can 
demonstrate a significant level of government involvement with his NBA franchise, he 
may allege an equal protection violation”).  However, the author does not detail the 
extent of the interdependence between NYRA and the state, and only notes that the 
association “received considerable funds” from the state. Id.  While the author’s 
conclusion is true, it is unlikely an NBA player could meet that burden.  The state 
essentially takes NYRA’s profits, and the only benefits the state takes from an NBA 
franchise, under normal circumstances, are indirect—i.e., via increased local employment 
opportunities to support the team and its facility, increased use of public transportation by 
fans, taxation, and increased tourism. 
 144 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
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otherwise private conduct a state action.145  The Court noted that 
the source of the NCAA rules is not the University of Nevada-Las 
Vegas (“UNLV”) or the state of Nevada, but rather the collective 
input of the member schools (many of which are state-owned and 
operated).146  Ultimately, the Court found that the state did not 
“provide[] a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the 
harm-causing individual actor.”147  The dissent, however, pointed 
out that UNLV, a public university, is a state actor, and its 
suspension of Jerry Tarkanian, the men’s basketball coach and a 
public employee, constitutes state action.148  Therefore, the dissent 
reasoned that, by acting jointly, the NCAA became a state actor.149 
Even under the dissent’s rationale, neither the NBA nor its 
member franchises should be considered state actors.  The decision 
to prohibit tattoo advertising is made solely by the NBA, not a 
governmental entity.  The state might have some involvement in 
other aspects of the team, but none that have an immediate impact 
on players such that they would perceive the league or team to be a 
state actor. 
2. Tattooing as Protected Speech 
Assuming that the NBA is a state actor, which it likely is not, 
another relevant question is whether a tattoo constitutes “speech.”  
While it is well-established law that protected speech can include 
non-verbal communication, courts have been reluctant to extend 
First Amendment protection to tattoos.150  However, as tattoos 
have become more mainstream in society, it is conceivable that 
they will be considered “speech” for First Amendment purposes 
under certain circumstances.  Furthermore, up to now most cases 
have addressed whether the process of tattooing can be considered 
 
 145 Id. at 199. 
 146 Id. at 193. 
 147 Id. at 192. 
 148 Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See, e.g., Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253–54 (D. Minn. 1980) 
(declining to address whether tattoos are art, and therefore protected by the First 
Amendment, acknowledging “the courts are ill equipped to determine such illusory and 
imponderable questions . . . .”). 
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protected speech, as opposed to whether the tattoo itself is 
protected speech. 
The earliest case addressing tattooing under the First 
Amendment is People v. O’Sullivan,151 in which a tattoo artist was 
convicted under a New York City law “prohibit[ing] all tattooing 
of human beings, except by licensed medical doctors for medical 
purposes.”152  The defendant was not a licensed medical doctor and 
he was not applying tattoos for medical reasons.153  The court 
rejected the defendant’s First Amendment claim, asserting that 
tattooing is not “speech or even symbolic speech, . . . and 
defendant’s right to engage in tattooing is not paramount to the 
public’s right to good health.”154  Ultimately, the court held that 
some interference with an individual’s liberty or property is 
permissible if public health is at stake.155  This left open the 
possibility that tattooing might be considered speech. 
The District of Minnesota addressed a similar issue in Yurkew 
v. Sinclair,156 in which the Minnesota State Fair Board of 
Managers refused to rent space at a state fair to the plaintiff, a 
tattoo artist.157  Again, the state argued that tattooing is not 
protected by the First Amendment, and that it had an interest in 
regulating tattooing due to health concerns.158  The court agreed, 
holding that “the actual process of tattooing is not sufficiently 
communicative in nature so as to rise to the plateau of important 
activity encompassed by the First Amendment.”159  The court 
asserted that just because an individual intends to communicate 
something does not mean that activity merits First Amendment 
protection.160  The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently 
 
 151 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Term. 1978). 
 152 Id. at 333. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980). 
 157 Id. at 1249. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 1253 (citing People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Term 1978)). 
 160 Id. at 1254; see also Medical Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. 
App. 1986) (citing O’Sullivan and Yurkew to hold that the process of tattooing is neither 
speech nor symbolic speech, and thus is not protected by the First Amendment, and 
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reached the same conclusion in State v. White,161 specifying that 
the plaintiff did not show that “the process of tattooing is 
communicative enough to automatically fall within First 
Amendment protection.”162 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals more directly addressed 
the issue of First Amendment protection for tattoos in Stephenson 
v. Davenport Community School District.163  In this case, a high 
school student was told to remove a tattoo that school 
administrators mistakenly thought was a gang symbol.164  In dicta, 
the court stated that Stephenson’s tattoo did not merit First 
Amendment protection because it “was simply ‘a form of self-
expression.’”165  Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court 
explained that the threshold question for First Amendment 
protection is “‘whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized 
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”166  
Because Stephenson did not intend any meaning behind the 
symbol, the tattoo did not receive First Amendment protection.167 
Finally, the court in Riggs v. City of Fort Worth168 muddled the 
issue when considering a local police department’s requirement 
that an officer cover the tattoos on his arms and legs.  Citing 
Stephenson and O’Sullivan, the court asserted: “a tattoo is not 
 
further holding that tattooing, whether done for medical or artistic/aesthetic purposes, 
must be performed by a licensed practitioner because tattooing is a medical procedure). 
 161 560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002). 
 162 Id. at 423. 
 163 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 164 Id. at 1304. 
 165 Id. at 1307 n.4 (citing Jt. App. at 63). 
 166 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (internal citation omitted)) 
(alterations in original). 
 167 Id. The court seemed concerned that this case was not close enough to Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which the 
Supreme Court held that “black armbands worn by students intended to convey 
opposition to Vietnam War constituted ‘silent, passive expression of opinion.’” Id. n.4.  
Had the students in Tinker tattooed a black band around their arms, instead of wearing a 
cloth armband over their shirtsleeves, the communicative intent would not have been 
lessened.  Perhaps the expression would have been even more powerful, given the 
permanency of tattoos and the financial cost of obtaining one. 
 168 229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
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protected speech under the First Amendment.”169  However, the 
Riggs court misconstrued the Stephenson and O’Sullivan decisions.  
The dicta in Stephenson applied only to the tattoo in that case, 
because the tattoo in question was not sufficiently 
communicative.170  It did not state that tattoos, by definition, are 
unprotected.171  Likewise, the O’Sullivan court addressed whether 
the process or act of “tattooing” was protected speech, not whether 
a tattoo itself can be considered protected speech.172  Thus, despite 
their generally adverse outcomes, the above cases do not contradict 
the possibility that tattoos could be considered protected speech 
under the First Amendment.  Thus far, the cases on the subject 
simply do not resolve the issue.173 
Further, as tattooing has become more mainstream—especially 
among athletes and entertainers—denying First Amendment 
protection to all tattoos would be unjustifiable.  Tattooing is not 
just for gang members, men who ride Harley-Davidsons, or other 
assorted so-called “deviants.”174  As NBA forward Jalen Rose 
stated in response to the idea of tattoo advertising, “You get a 
tattoo about something that’s real dear to you.  That’s what makes 
 
 169 Id. at 580. 
 170 See Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1307 n.4. 
 171 Id. at 1307. 
 172 See People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Term 1978). 
 173 The case law reveals that courts may have been swayed by anachronistic perceptions 
of tattoos.  Though it decided the case on other grounds, the O’Sullivan court cited a 
lower court decision referring to tattooing as a “‘barbaric survival, often associated with a 
morbid or abnormal personality.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 
N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1964)).  In addition, the Stephenson case never would have 
entered a courtroom—and the plaintiff never would have had surgery to remove her 
tattoo—had schoolteachers and police officers not reacted so extremely to an innocuous 
tattoo.  Several teachers and an officer deemed the tattoo to be a gang symbol simply 
from looking at it. See Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1305.  Another officer also considered it a 
gang tattoo, without ever viewing it. See id.  The plaintiff, Brianna Stephenson, was an 
eighth grade student, was doing well in her classes, and had no disciplinary problems.  
There was no evidence that she was ever affiliated with gangs. Id. 
 174 See, e.g., Major L.M. Campanella, The Regulation of “Body Art” in the Military: 
Piercing the Veil of Service Members’ Constitutional Rights, 161 MIL. L. REV. 56, 98 
(1999) (“[People with tattoos] have, in the past, been labeled by American society as the 
deviants of society.  This label was based primarily on the fact that tattoos were not 
traditionally a part of mainstream society.  Today, however, tattoos have moved from 
being traditionally unacceptable to a more socially accepted form of ‘art.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
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you sit down and go through the process of putting something on 
you that will be there the rest of your life. . . .”175  Thus, the issue 
of whether tattoos are protected “speech” is yet to be resolved.  
Most case law analyzing tattoos under the First Amendment 
scrutinize the tattooing process, not the tattoo itself.176  
Nevertheless, tattoos could earn First Amendment protection under 
some circumstances as they become more mainstream in society. 
3. Tattoo Advertising as Protected Speech 
Finally, again assuming that the NBA is a state actor, and 
assuming that tattoos can constitute speech under the First 
Amendment, athletes face yet more hurdles: (a) not all speech 
receives the same level of protection under the Constitution, and 
(b) even if the speech is generally protected, free speech 
protections are more limited in the workplace. 
Tattoo advertising is commercial speech, which the Supreme 
Court has held merits limited First Amendment protection.177  In 
addition, if the NBA is a state actor, it must comply with 
employment law free speech standards.178  The most recent major 
 
 175 Nance, supra note 32.  Rose also added that getting a temporary tattoo advertisement 
is “not something I would do.” Id. 
 176 See supra notes 151–62 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“[S]peech is not stripped of First 
Amendment protection merely because it appears in [the] form [of paid commercial 
advertisements].” (citations omitted).  “The existence of ‘commercial activity, in itself, is 
no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First 
Amendment.’” (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966))); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) 
(“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to 
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”).  However, the state may 
regulate commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading. See id. at 771 
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own 
sake.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State 
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961))).  Further, the state may impose time, place, and 
manner restrictions on expressive activity, whether the location where the expression 
takes place is considered a public forum, a forum open to communication, or a forum not 
open to communication. See generally Dean, supra note 113, at 169–72 (discussing the 
differences between a public forum, a forum open to communication and a forum not 
open to communication, and discussing the limits on the state’s ability to regulate). 
 178 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
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Supreme Court case on this issue is Connick v. Myers,179 in which 
the Court affirmed the principle that any restriction on speech by a 
public employee must “seek ‘a balance between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.’”180  The Court went on to say that it must consider the 
content, form, and context of the given statement when 
determining whether a matter is of public concern.181  It further 
narrowed the contours of protected speech in the workplace by 
stating that government employers should be granted “wide 
latitude in managing their offices” in cases where “employee 
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”182 
Connick limits the free speech claim of an NBA player 
significantly.  First, the NBA is not a state actor.183  Second, courts 
have been slow to recognize tattoos as protected speech or 
expression.184  Third, assuming the NBA is a state actor—a 
tenuous assumption at best—commercial tattoo advertising is of 
minimal “political, social, or other concern to the community.”185  
Accordingly, an NBA player challenging the league on tattoo 
advertising is unlikely to succeed on First Amendment grounds. 
III. MUST THE NBA NEGOTIATE ITS PROHIBITION OF TATTOO 
ADVERTISING THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING? 
With the First Amendment analysis weighing against the 
players, their best hope for pursuing the right to wear tattoo 
advertisements is to try to force the issue into collective 
 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 181 Id. at 147–48. 
 182 Id. at 146; see also Thomas E. Fielder, Keep Your Mouth Shut and Listen: The NFL 
Player’s Right of Free Expression, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 547, 571 (2002) (“The 
overall effect of Myers was to deny government employees protection for anything other 
than political speech.”). 
183  See supra Part II.B.1. 
184  See supra Part II.B.2. 
185   Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; see supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text. 
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bargaining.  The players’ union would be in position to bargain on 
behalf of all players to gain concessions from the NBA on the 
issue.  But, like the Lanham Act and First Amendment analyses, 
the law here weighs against the players as well.  Decisions of the 
NLRB and judicial interpretations of what constitutes an “unfair 
labor practice” under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”)186 indicate that the NBA may lawfully establish its 
tattoo advertising policy without submitting to collective 
bargaining. 
Section 8(d) of the NLRA requires that the employer and 
representatives of employees meet “and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”187  In other words, issues pertaining to employee 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”188 
are mandatory subject matter for collective bargaining—meaning 
the employer and a representative for the employees must bargain 
collectively in good faith.189  Employers may refuse to bargain on 
all permissive subject matter, which is defined broadly as all 
subject matter that is not mandatory—i.e., not pertaining to 
“wages, hours, [or] other terms and conditions of employment.”190 
A. Tattoo Advertising Income as “Wages” 
There is no clear answer to whether the right to wear temporary 
tattoo advertising would qualify as mandatory subject matter for 
collective bargaining purposes.  The practice almost certainly is 
 
 186 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1994). 
 187 Id. § 158(d).  The relevant portion of section 8(d) of the Act reads: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of 
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
 188 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
 189 Id. 
 190 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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not considered part of the player’s “wages.”  As one early ruling 
interpreting the NLRA states: 
The word “wages,” following the phrase “rates of pay” in 
the Act must have been intended to comprehend more than 
the amount of remuneration per unit of time worked or per 
unit of work produced. . . .  This does not necessarily mean 
that the word “wages” as used in the Act covers all 
satisfactions, pleasures or gratifications arising from 
employment such as playing on a company baseball team, 
or attending a company picnic, or belonging to a company 
social club, although perhaps under some peculiar 
circumstances of employment in an isolated plant it might.  
Nor does our construction of the word “wages” necessarily 
mean that we construe it as covering “real wages” in all the 
breadth with which some economists use that phrase.191 
Under the W.W. Cross court’s rationale, any argument that the 
pursuit of tattoo advertising deals constitutes “wages” will fail.  
The fact that the players stand to earn money through tattoo 
advertising does not qualify it as a “wage.”  Tattoo advertising is, 
in essence, exploitation of one’s employment to pursue another 
business interest.  It is even more tangential to a player’s “wages” 
than, for example, attending the company picnic. 
B. Tattoo Advertising as “Other Terms or Conditions of 
Employment” 
The Players’ Association, in challenging the NBA prohibition, 
would need to show that tattoo advertising fits under the “other 
terms and conditions of employment” umbrella.192  From early in 
the history of the NLRA, courts have been reluctant to expand 
“terms and conditions of employment.”193  Section 8(d) of the 
 
 191 W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949). 
 192 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 193 See, e.g., Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 32–33 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(citations omitted), in which the court stated: 
Only as to those matters enumerated in Section 8(d) of the Act is there a 
mandatory obligation to bargain under Section 8(a)(5).  And, as to those 
matters specified in Section 8(d), the phrase ‘terms and conditions of 
employment’ is to be interpreted in a limited sense which does not include 
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NLRA “does not say that the employer and employees are bound 
to confer upon any subject which interests either of them; the 
specification of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment defines a limited category of issues subject to 
compulsory bargaining.”194  There must be a strong connection to 
employee wages or hours for the employer action to be considered 
a mandatory bargaining subject.195  The tattoo advertising scenario 
does not come close enough to wage, free agency, salary cap, 
revenue sharing,196 or other employment issues197 that have been 
found to be mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.198  As one 
recent court held: “In general, ‘only issues that settle an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and employees’ are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.  An issue arising from outside 
the bargaining unit may be a mandatory subject of bargaining if it 
 
every issue that might be of interest to unions or employers.  A mere remote, 
indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient. 
 194 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 546 (1967) (quoting Justice 
Stewart’s concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220–21, 
223–24 (1964)). 
 195 Id. at 547 (recognizing “a legal distinction between those subjects which have a 
material or significant impact upon wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, and 
those which are only indirectly, incidentally, or remotely related to those subjects”). 
 196 Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
“[m]inimum individual salaries [of NBA players,] fringe benefits, minimum aggregate 
team salaries, and guaranteed revenue sharing” are mandatory subject matters of 
collective bargaining under the NLRA). 
 197 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the 
NFL’s “Rozelle Rule,” which required “inter-team compensation when a player’s 
contractual obligation to one team expires and he is signed by another . . . [and which] 
operates to restrict a player’s ability to move from one team to another and depresses 
player salaries,” is a mandatory subject matter for collective bargaining under the 
NLRA). 
 198 But see McKelvey, supra note 59, at 25.  The author argues that a prohibition on 
tattoo advertising would need to be collectively bargained.  However, despite stating that 
“[n]umerous decisions of the [NLRB] . . . strongly indicate that a league rule prohibiting 
the ability of a player to wear temporary tattoos would be viewed as a ‘condition of 
employment,’” the author cites just one case.  That case held that a change or revision in 
the dress code without collectively bargaining with the employees’ union is a violation of 
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Transp. Enters., 240 N.L.R.B. 551, 560 (1979); see also 
Kaminski v. Chrysler Corp., 983 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (“[E]mployee 
work rules, especially those leading to disciplinary action, are subject to mandatory 
collective bargaining.”). 
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‘vitally affects’ the terms and conditions of employment within the 
bargaining unit . . . .”199 
Furthermore, as stated in Justice Stewart’s concurrence in 
Fibreboard Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board: 
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as 
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such 
managerial decisions, which lie at the core of 
entrepreneurial control.  Decisions concerning the 
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of 
the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about 
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision 
may be necessarily to terminate employment.200 
Using Justice Stewart’s reasoning, the NBA would merely be 
seeking to preserve the contractual relationships it already has with 
numerous sponsors, and to protect the NBA brand and the league.  
These business interests, while perhaps not geared toward 
preventing the immediate downfall of the league, serve the long-
term goal of preserving goodwill with sponsors.  The fact that 
players are adversely affected by a tattoo advertising ban does not 
necessarily mandate collective bargaining. 
 It would be to the players’ benefit if the NBA based prohibition 
of tattoo advertising on the notion that tattoo advertisements are 
demeaning to the athlete or that they create an unsavory work 
environment for players.  Such arguments would only draw 
attention to the issue as one concerning the well-being of athletes 
in the “workplace,” and thus, an issue that must be collectively 
bargained as a “term or condition of employment.”201  By framing 
the issue in terms of the business interests of the league, the NBA 
would distance itself from players’ rights issues, and avoid the 
appearance of paternalism with respect to employees. 
 
 199 Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 119–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
 200 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Mark M. Rabuano, An 
Examination of Drug-Testing as Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining in Major 
League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439, 446–57 (2002) (discussing mandatory 
and permissive subjects of bargaining, and arguing that drug testing must be a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining). 
 201 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the opinion of the marketing executive who attempted to 
launch tattoo advertising in the NBA: “[Tattoo advertising] is 
going to happen.  It’s really just a matter of when.”202  He may be 
correct in saying that a player will attempt a tattoo advertising 
campaign.  If your local baseball radio broadcasters have already 
agreed to mention an auto insurance company every time the home 
team completes a double play, can a “Dunkin’ Donuts” basketball 
bicep billboard be far behind?  The league, however, is likely to 
prevail.  The NBA has real economic incentives to oppose tattoo 
advertising, and, as a private actor, would be immune to a 
constitutional challenge. 
 
 
 202 Walker, supra note 2. 
